We discuss several uses of blockchain (and, more generally, distributed ledger) technologies outside of cryptocurrencies with a pragmatic view. We mostly focus on three areas: the role of coin economies for what we refer to as data malls (specialized data marketplaces); data provenance (a historical record of data and its origins); and what we term keyless payments (made without having to know other users' cryptographic keys). We also discuss voting and other areas, and give a sizable list of academic and nonacademic references.
Introduction
Blockchain is a ledger for keeping a record of all transactions. It is a time-sequential chain of blocks containing transaction records. Blocks are linked using cryptography and time-stamping (see Figure 1) . The data in a given block cannot be altered retroactively without altering all subsequent blocks, 4 which makes blockchain resistant to modification of data by design. For historical reasons [Nakamoto, 2008] , 5 transactions in blockchain are usually thought of as relating to peer-to-peer (P2P) payments with blockchain as a distributed ledger maintained by a P2P network that itself validates new blocks. However, blockchain is not synonymous with payments or decentralization. A priori, blockchain can record other types of transactions. Also, blockchain need not be maintained by a P2P network but, instead, by a centralized authority.
In decentralized blockchain-based cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin (BTC) and Ethereum (ETH), verification of transactions by a P2P network is achieved via mining, a process whereby GPUs/CPUs solve computational problems. As part of this process, miners (among others) maintain copies of blockchain. Miners receive fees in respective cryptocurrencies. Mining is computationally and energy costly and has been argued to be inefficient and possibly even unsustainable as blockchain grows (see, e.g., [Bariviera, 2017] , [Kostakis and Giotitsas, 2014] , [Nadarajah and Chu, 2017] , [Urquhart, 2016] , [Vranken, 2017] ). In contrast, anticipated centralized government-issued cryptocurrencies (e.g., CryptoRuble) do not require mining and in some sense are more "efficient" as transactions are verified by a centralized authority (e.g., a central bank) [Kakushadze and Liew, 2017] . 6 In government-issued cryptocurrencies one of the main allures of decentralized cryptocurrencies -anonymity of transactions -is gone. However, employing blockchain (vs. traditional bank ledgers) can help prevent/reduce fraud, errors, etc.
The decentralized v. centralized cryptocurrency example highlights that, as with most things in life, whether using blockchain for solving a particular problem adds value depends on practical considerations and the answer can vary from instance to instance. In this article, we 4 Thus, when blockchain is maintained by a large network as a distributed ledger (see below) continually updated on numerous systems simultaneously, a nefarious alteration would require collusion of the network majority. 5 For a much earlier work on an anonymous cryptographic electronic money or electronic cash system known as "ecash", see [Chaum, 1983 [Chaum, , 1985 , which served as a basis for Chaum's electronic money company DigiCash, Inc. founded in 1989. In 1998 DigiCash filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and was sold for assets in 2002 [Pitta, 1999] . 6 Also see references therein. For subsequent related articles, see, e.g., [Bershidsky, 2017] , [Holmes, 2017] .
discuss some potential applications of blockchain outside of cryptocurrencies from a pragmatic viewpoint. We mostly focus on three areas: the role of coin economies for data malls; data
provenance; and what we term keyless payments. We also touch upon applications to voting. [Stahl, Löser and Vossen, 2015] , [Stahl et al, 2016] , [Yu and Zhang, 2017] , [Zuiderwijk et al, 2014] . The idea of a data marketplace in the context of the Internet of Things (IoT) has recently gained traction with the IOTA Data Marketplace (IOTADM) [Schiener, 2017] , [Sønstebø, 2017] launched by the IOTA Foundation [Ponciano, 2017] , which circulates its own coin MIOTA. 7 The technology underlying MIOTA and IOTADM is the so-called "Tangle", which is a distributed ledger. 8 IOTADM is an open and decentralized data lake (see, e.g., [IBD, 2017] , [Ramakrishnan et al, 2017] ) accessible to any paying party. Its scope is broad.
Data Malls
One of the challenges of broad data marketplaces is precisely their breadth of scope.
E.g., it would be difficult to convince a mainstream capital markets professional to purchase stock market pricing data from a data marketplace that is a hodgepodge of vastly disparate data types (hypothetically) ranging from measurements made by a sensor mounted on a weather balloon hovering somewhere above Antarctica to some quantitative properties of bacteria found in the guts of livestock in remote regions of Tibet and everything in between… Furthermore, such broad data marketplaces based on data lakes would normally store data in its raw, unprocessed form, 9 so the burden of making sense of such data (cleaning it, formatting it, etc.) falls on the end-user. For some applications (and industries) this may work just fine. But in other cases, e.g., in capital markets, finance, quantitative trading, etc., end-users desire more of a plug-and-play type of data, which they can utilize without expending prohibitive effort. 
Coin Economies
So, in some sense, Data Malls provide a middle ground, a hybrid model, between the status quo and the radical idea of completely unstructured, hodgepodge data marketplaces based on data lakes. Blockchain (and similar distributed ledger) technologies can provide decentralized user networks connecting data sellers and buyers. A Coin Economy is a simple way of achieving this.
Thus, blockchain-based Ethereum smart contract technology (see, e.g., [Buterin, 2014] , [Christidis and Devetsiokiotis, 2016] , [Cuccuru, 2017] , [Fairfield, 2014] , [Koulu, 2016] , [Levy, 2017] , [Marvin, 2016] , [Mik, 2017] , [Omohundro, 2014] , [O'Shields, 2017], [Piasecki, 2016] , [Raskin, 2017] , [Savelyev, 2017] , [Sillaber and Waltl, 2017] , [Szabo, 1996 [Szabo, , 1997 , [Werbach and Cornell, 2017] , [Wood, 2014] , [Xie, 2017a,b] e.g., [Hull, 2012] ), if there is a market for such derivatives, thereby forgoing the upswing upside.
If the coin is not exchange-traded, then liquidity becomes an issue. After all, the vendor wishes to monetize its data, not just acquire illiquid tokens. There is an old-fashioned simple solution for this, akin the good ol' Chuck E. Cheese tokens. Suppose a vendor collected dollars worth of tokens through sales. With proof of sale, the token issuer will swap these tokens for dollars in fiat money, 13 where (also see Figure 2 )
Here is some reasonable predefined percentage. In essence, resembles a sales commission percentage and the token issuer makes dollars from the vendor's sale, where
Except that is paid not for sales, but for access to the network: the vendor "outsources" sales to the network, it is not required to hire salespeople, etc. The network creator gets rewarded for creating the network, just, e.g., as with Auger or Golem. Let us mention that Eqns. (1), (2) do 12 By "coin" we mean coin or token and vice-versa, as may be applicable best. 13 In practice, with, e.g., Ethereum-based tokens, this payment can be made in ether (ETH) and then the vendor can convert ETH to fiat money. Both the vendor and network creator have exchange rate exposure (see above).
not capture all transaction fees associated with the sale. E.g., with Ethereum-based tokens each user needs a wallet to transact in such a token, and transaction fees are paid to the Ethereum blockchain miner of the block containing the user's smart contract. These transaction fees are paid in ETH [Ethereum, 2018] and used to be small, even recently [Young, 2017] . However, the cryptocurrency prices have skyrocketed lately, and so have the fees, including for ETH (see, e.g., [BitInfoCharts, 2018] ). One issue with rapidly rising absolute (as opposed to relative to the ETH price) transaction fees is their adverse effects on the viability of micropayments using ETH.
Increasing transaction fees, so long as they remain within reason, albeit unpleasant, do not affect big-ticket data sales (e.g., a datafeed that costs $100,000/yr). But they can adversely affect small deals requiring micropayments. This includes pay-per-use cases such as access to blogs, research reports, etc., which can be valuable to a number of users provided that they are reasonably priced (with monetization through volume rather than high margins). Being able to make micropayments without incurring prohibitive transaction costs is paramount to such uses.
Are networks such as Ethereum going to adjust to the changing reality (cryptocurrency prices skyrocketing) and change the transaction fee structure? It is unclear how realistic this is considering that micropayments are not the biggest sources of revenues for the miners. There are efforts to fill this niche, e.g., μRaiden (MicroRaiden), which specializes in micropayments on the Ethereum network [Silver, 2017] . Unsurprisingly, this is an "off-blockchain" solution. In this regard, a Data Mall network creator may as well consider implementing its own solution. In fact, one may further argue that the entire blockchain solution can be implemented organically as opposed to using a network such as Ethereum. We can take this line of reasoning further and consider an organic blockchain solution with no mining: all transactions are verified by a central authority (the network creator), thereby completely eliminating transaction fees in P2P or B2B
(business-to-business) payments. 14 Micropayments are then no less viable than large payments.
The network creator's efforts are compensated via the fees collected from vendors (Eqn. (2)).
Would this not defy the purpose of blockchain -decentralization -in the first instance?
This is not an "ideological" question but a pragmatic one. 15 To the network creator the appeal 14 One solution is to have 2 tokens: Ethereum-based "class A" for liquidity, and internal "class B" for transactions.
The "class B" token need not be blockchain-based. It can be maintained in any database by the central authority. 15 In this regard, note that many cryptocurrencies (or, more precisely, coins/tokens) are not mined (see Table 1 ).
of the blockchain technology is mainly in that it does not have to reinvent the wheel and can use an open source solution as opposed to building its own ledger from scratch. For the users (both the vendors and the data consumers) it is not important that the transactions are minedso long as the accounting is done right, it does not really matter whether it is done by miners or in a centralized fashion. In the context of a Data Mall, the users simply want a solution with lower costs. Blockchain can still play a sizable role from the users' perspective (as opposed to that of the network creator) in this essentially "hybrid" approach: i) it provides a backbone for a decentralized Data Mall; and ii) it can record all transactions for transparency (without mining).
We emphasize that the "hybrid" approach we discuss above is not confined only to Data 
Data Provenance
Data provenance/validation is one of the contemplated applications of blockchain (see, e.g., [Azaria et al, 2016] , [Dooley, 2017] However, there are cases where blockchain could play a role in data provenance. In this regard, it is important to take a pragmatic approach and accept as a fact of life that populating blockchain with large data is impracticable. What is practicable is to place some much smaller metadata on blockchain. This metadata can, e.g., describe the changes made to the data. Wiki databases are viable examples of this application. Such databases can contain large amounts of data and it is impracticable to put it all on blockchain. Nor is there any pressing need to do so from a pragmatic viewpoint. However, recording the history/metadata associated with edits to such a wiki database can very well be practicable (assuming the recorded data is reasonably concise). E.g., the history of Wikipedia entry edits could possibly be recorded on blockchain. In fact, Everipedia is planning to convert to EOS blockchain (which will store not all information, but lighter data) while using the Interplanetary File System (IPFS) (for storing data-heavy files such as images and videos) [Del Castillo, 2017b] , [Hertig, 2017] , [Rubin, 2017] , [Stanley, 2017] .
This kind of approach, which in principle is practicable, can be applied to other types of networks, including Data Malls. Whether using IPFS is required would depend on a given situation: notwithstanding the hype, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with private entities storing their data on secure servers, properly backed up, with failover protocols in place, etc.
Not everything needs to be decentralized. Pragmatic considerations should be the guide in this.
Everipedia, which is Wikipedia's main competitor, will also use its own token called "IQ"
for payments on its network. IQ will be used to incentivize content creation. IQ is going to be minable: it will be mined by editors, curators, etc., by making accurate, valuable contributions to "the encyclopedia of everything", as Everipedia refers to itself. This too is a Coin Economy.
Keyless Payments
With a proliferation of cryptocurrencies and tokens, things got a bit "messier" than before. If With cryptocurrencies and tokens one also deals with digital wallets. However, there is no service similar to PayPal or others described above where all one needs is the recipient's email address or some other easy-to-remember ID/handle. 16 [Boucher, 2016] , [Firth, 2017] , [Gabison, 2016] , [Higgins, 2017] , [Koven, 2016] , [Lee et al, 2016] .
Here we will not delve into voting in the political context. Instead, we focus on corporate (proxy) voting. It is no secret that small shareholders are effectively disenfranchised for all intents and purposes (see, e.g., [Kakushadze, 2015] , [Mourning, 2007] , [Wilcox, 2004] , [Wink and O'Leary, 2009 ]) as they either do not actually vote or, if they do, it is done though a proxy vote (see, e.g., [Investopedia, 2018] ). This archaic process, especially when a proxy ballot and a proxy statement are sent by mail, 19 is cumbersome and many small shareholders do not even 17 For some literature on mobile payments, see, e.g., [Au, 2008] , [Carton et al, 2012] , [Chandra, Srivastava and Theng, 2010] , [Chen, 2008] [Hayashi, 2012] , [Isaac, and Zeadally, 2014] , [Jacob, 2007] , [Jaradat and AlMashaqba, 2014], [Karnouskos, 2004] , [Karnouskos et al, 2008] , [Kemp, 2013] , [Kim, Mirusmonov and Lee, 2010] , [Kreyer, Turowski and Pousttchi, 2003 ], [Laukkannen, 2008] , [Liébana-Cabanillas, Sánchez-Fernández and Muñoz-Leiva, 2014], [Liu, 2016] , [Liu, Kauffman and Ma, 2015] , [Lu et al, 2011] , [Mallat, 2007] , [Mallat and Tuunainen, 2008] , [Mbogo, 2010] , [Niranjanamurthy, 2014] , [Ondrus and Pigneur, 2006] , [Polasik et al, 2013] , [Pousttchi, 2008] , [Rodrigues et al, 2014] , [Schierz, Schilke and Wirtz, 2010] , [Shaw, 2014] , [Shin, 2009] , [Slade et al, 2015] , [Tan et al, 2014] , [Thakur and Srivastava, 2014] . See [Hanly, 2017] on Square accepting mobile payments in BTC. 18 Albeit one's bank account enjoys robust protections from fraudulent activities, which cryptoassets do not afford. 19 Not to mention all the trees this kills.
bother. Large shareholders -the movers and shakers -then control the company without input from many smaller shareholders, who effectively are disenfranchised, even if unintentionally.
A foolproof online voting system would allow shareholders to be more engaged. This is where blockchain technology can be useful. There appears to be concrete progress made in this direction; see, e.g., [AST, 2017] , [Crichton, 2017] , [De, 2017a] , [Kovlyagina and Yakovlev, 2016] , [NASDAQ, 2017] , [Rizzo, 2017] . This is an interesting application of blockchain technology. What remains to be seen is if it sticks. It is important to consider that without mining "many in-house blockchain solutions will be nothing more than cumbersome databases" [Hampton, 2016]. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we discussed some applications and aspects of blockchain. Other applications have been contemplated. Table 2 summarizes a partial list of areas where blockchain has been or may be implemented. Some of these applications will probably withstand the test of time, some may not. What is clear is that blockchain technology has already made a huge impacteven though some of this impact could be very transient -and is likely to continue to do so for years to come as it appears to appeal to and excite scores of enthusiasts, entrepreneurs, momand-pop as well as professional investors, technologists, scholars, futurists, etc. Perhaps one of the reasons is captured in by-now-"iconic" schematic depiction of "centralized vs. decentralized vs. distributed" (see Figure 3 ). Let us conclude with our message: "Pragmatism over Ideology!" Each buyer may acquire data from more than one vendor. A vendor can also be a buyer and acquire data from another vendor. And so on.
